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Abstract 
Utilizing the Aircraft Sustainability Model (ASM), Air Force logisticians must 
determine the best possible number and mix of spares and repair parts for each 
deployable readiness spares package, better known as a mobility readiness spares 
package (MRSP).  By analyzing MRSP support for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), 
Air Force leadership can have a current picture of MRSP operational effectiveness and 
mission support capabilities.  This research focused on determining the current 
configuration of MRSPs for OIF by selecting a representative array of MRSPs and 
supported weapon systems actively involved in OIF, and obtaining relevant support 
effectiveness measures.  Measures selected for analysis were MRSP fill rate, stockage 
effectiveness, issue effectiveness, mission capable spares rate, and total requirements 
variance.  An analysis of MRSPs for the E-3B, F-16C, and HC-130P aircraft revealed 
varying levels of effectiveness when compared with overall contingency and supply 
chain metrics. 
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THE OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF MOBILITY READINESS SPARES PACKAGE 
CONFIGURATION DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
According to AFMAN 23-110, Volume I, Part 1, Chapter 14, Readiness Spares 
Packages (RSP) and High Priority Mission Support Kits (HPMSK), the objective of the 
readiness spares package (RSP) program is “to support national strategy in consonance 
with the guidance issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  Specifically, the Air 
Force objective is to authorize, acquire on time, preposition, prestock, and maintain in a 
serviceable condition ready for use, all RSP needed to support the wartime activities 
specified in the War and Mobilization Plan (WMP)” (DAF, 2004:Ch. 14, 6).  Utilizing 
the Aircraft Sustainability Model (ASM), a mathematical tool based on the Dyna-
METRIC model, Air Force logisticians must determine the best possible number and mix 
of spares and repair parts for each deployable RSP, better known as a mobility readiness 
spares package (MRSP).  Each MRSP is designed for a “worst case scenario”, to support 
a weapon system in a contingency environment for 30 days with no resupply.  With this 
objective in mind, regulations also require that “items and quantities in RSPs will, in all 
cases, be the minimum necessary to support major command required missions as 
reflected in WMP tasking” (DAF, 2004:Ch. 14, 6). 
The operational environment of the Air Force has significantly changed since the 
end of the Cold War.  The concept of all-out, full-scale war is no longer applicable when 
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determining deployment support.  Instead, most of today’s war fighting consists of small 
contingencies for relatively short periods of time.  Instead of requiring a full-scale 
forward deployment of forces, war fighting is a surge from peace-time support to 
contingency support.  Recently, the Secretary of Defense defined this as a change from 
requirements-driven force development to a capabilities-based approach. 
In the past, the construct of force development was requirements-driven based 
upon specific threats.  However, the United States cannot predict with 
confidence the nations, combinations of nations, or non-state actors that may 
pose threats to its interests, allies or friends.  To mitigate the risk of this 
uncertainty, the United States must anticipate the range of broad capabilities 
that any adversary might employ and the necessary capabilities required to 
resolve any conflict or crisis.  Thus, a capabilities-based approach shifts this 
construct from threat-based force development to force planning based on a 
set of desired capabilities for any given military operation.  (DoD, 2003:3) 
 
One way Air Force leadership responded to this change in operational 
environment was by reorganizing into ten Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in 
1999.  Linked to one of two Air Force Expeditionary Wings (AEW), and crafted to meet 
the needs of a regional commander, each AEF “includes approximately 175 aircraft and 
20,000 people from both the active and reserve components” (O’Rourke, 2003:28).  The 
AEF structure brings two important components to the deployment arena.  First is 
predictability.  Although it is still not possible to predict exactly when a contingency will 
occur, AEF forces “rotate on a 15-month training and deployment cycle, during which 
they may be deployed for up to 90 days” (O’Rourke, 2003:28).  The second is speed.  
Whereas it might take several days to prepare an entire squadron or wing to deploy, the 
new structure ideally provides the ability “to deploy an AEF in 48 hours and up to five 
AEFs within 15 days” (O’Rourke, 2003:28).  This new operational strategy created “an 
organizational structure and rotational deployment schedule that would permit the Air 
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Force to effectively meet worldwide contingency demands without placing undue strains 
on equipment and personnel” (O’Rourke, 2003:28). 
Although Air Force leadership has responded to the changes in operational 
environment, the support structure of the MRSP has remained the same.  The current 
method of MRSP development and administration, as required by the WMP-5, has 
changed little from the Cold War threat assessment policy.  It would stand to reason that 
MRSP support should be tailored to meet each specific threat as a rule, not the exception.  
A 2000 Department of Defense report to Congress on challenges faced during Operation 
ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo indicated a disconnect between the way MRSPs are 
configured and the way contingency operations actually unfold. 
Present day U.S. Air Force Mobility Readiness Spares Package (MRSP) levels 
reflect the projected demands for a scenario involving two nearly 
simultaneous major theater wars and rely heavily on the availability of 
deployed aircraft that can be cannibalized for spare parts to offset MRSP 
shortfalls. Cannibalization is the primary source of many parts not carried in 
present fighter MRSPs. When these MRSPs are used to support a partial 
squadron deployment (split-based operations), stay behind (home station) 
aircraft must be cannibalized to fill spares shortfalls of the deployed element, 
since there are not enough aircraft deployed to meet spares (cannibalization) 
requirements. The lower than planned aircraft loss rates and higher aircraft 
availability rates experienced in OAF exacerbated this problem by increasing 
the demand for spares while further limiting the availability of cannibalization 
aircraft. 
 
Our experience in Operation Allied Force provided indication that current Air 
Force Mobility Readiness Spares Packages may be insufficient to achieve 
aircraft availability targets under the Air Force’s Air Expeditionary Force 
(AEF) concept. For AEF commitments, the Air Force may not deploy entire 
squadrons, creating split-based operating conditions not unlike those 
experienced during Allied Force.  (DoD, 2000:101) 
 
This report highlights the importance of effective MRSP support in a contingency 
operation.  Recent wartime operations in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) 
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provided an excellent opportunity to examine the current operational effectiveness of 
MRSPs.  Air Force leadership should know whether the theoretical models they rely on 
to provide accurate assessments of wartime scenario requirements are providing 
information and inputs that lead to mission success. 
Problem Statement 
Air Force leadership recognizes that the need for efficient and effective MRSP 
support in contingency operations is critical to weapon system and Air Force mission 
success.  By analyzing MRSP support for OIF, the Air Force can get a current picture of 
MRSP operational effectiveness and mission support capabilities. 
Research Question 
The main focus of this research was to answer the research question, “What was 
the effect of MRSP configuration on current Air Force contingency operations support?”.  
By understanding the impact of MRSPs on weapon system availability during Operation 
IRAQI FREEDOM, the Air Force may wish to explore alternatives to the current method 
of contingency support that more closely reflect current operational environment 
requirements. 
Investigative Questions 
In order to properly direct the research and answer the research question, the 
following investigative questions and sub questions were explored. 
1. How were MRSPs configured for OIF? 
 
2. Did MRSPs effectively support the weapon systems during the first 30 days of 
operations? 
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a. Did the MRSPs have enough spares for aircraft maintenance personnel to 
keep aircraft mission capable?  In other words, did we take what was 
needed to the conflict? 
 
b. Did the MRSPs have the right spares for aircraft maintenance personnel to 
keep aircraft mission capable?  In other words, did we need what we took 
to the conflict? 
Scope 
The Air Force used 863 aircraft and 29 weapon systems, either deployed to or in 
support of OIF (USCENTAF, 2003:6).  This research was limited to examining the 
spares support provided by three different MRSPs for three different deployed weapon 
systems, the E-3B, F-16C, and HC-130P.  MRSP selection was further limited to single 
units of each weapon system and one location for each weapon system. 
Methodology 
The methodology of this research focused on three main objectives.  The first was 
to determine the configuration of MRSPs for OIF and whether they mirrored the actual 
authorizations as dictated by the WMP, Volume 5 (WMP-5).  The second objective was 
to select for analysis a representative array of MRSPs and supported weapon systems 
actively involved in supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from contingency 
locations.  The last objective was to obtain and analyze relevant support effectiveness 
data for the first 30 days of OIF (19 March – 17 April 2003). 
Summary 
This chapter has provided background for the thesis topic and the questions that 
the research will attempt to answer.  Chapter two is a literature review that will explain 
thesis related concepts and discuss previous works related to the thesis topic.  Chapter 
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three will explain the methodology used in collecting, analyzing and reporting the results 
of the data.  Chapter four will present the results of the data collection.  Finally, Chapter 
five will discuss conclusions and observations drawn from the results, as well as any 
future research opportunities. 
 
7 
II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background on understanding the two 
main aspects of the research objective:  how are MRSPs currently configured, and what 
criteria can be used to determine MRSP effectiveness.  This chapter will also introduce 
and examine previous studies on MRSP performance during contingency operations. 
MRSP Characteristics 
Chapter 14.32 of AFMAN 23-110 outlines the basic components of MRSP 
configuration: 
Required quantities for individual items in RSPs are computed in the D087G 
System.  ASM is the mathematical tool used for the computation.  It is based 
largely on the Dyna-METRIC pipeline model…The requirement computation 
does not attempt stockage to achieve 100 percent mission capability, since that is 
neither economically practical nor statistically feasible.  The goal instead is 
expressed as the number of aircraft required, called the DSO, or as its inverse, the 
NMCS target.  (DAF, 2004:Ch. 14, 23) 
 
It is now necessary to discuss these factors that contribute to the MRSP computation—
the Dyna-METRIC pipeline model, the Aircraft Sustainability Model (ASM), the Direct 
Support Objective (DSO) and the Requirements Execution Availability Logistics Module 
(D087G).   
Dyna-METRIC Pipeline Model 
The Dyna-METRIC mathematical statistical model was developed by the Rand 
Corporation as a tool for “studying the transient behavior of component repair/inventory 
systems under time-dependent operational demands and logistics decisions like those that 
might be experienced in wartime” (Sherbrooke, 1992:184).  There are both analytical and 
 
8 
simulation versions of the model.  The simulation model can provide an assessment of 
how a given set of spares will perform under a certain logistics scenario.  The analytical 
model can do two things:  compute aircraft availability based on spares levels, or 
compute spares levels based on aircraft availability. The Dyna-METRIC model is a 
stochastic, multi-item, multi-location, multi-echelon, multi-indenture system for dynamic 
demand scenarios with the ultimate goal being maximization of aircraft availability 
(Anderson, 2003:6-5). The model requires recognition of several key assumptions: 
• Demands arrive randomly with a known mean and variance according to either a 
Poisson or negative binomial distribution 
 
• Line replaceable unit (LRU) demand is proportional to either flying hours or 
sortie rate 
 
• Demand and service process times are independent 
 
• Repair and transportation times have a known probability distribution with either 
an exponential or deterministic mean 
 
• Repair times vary by component and transportation times vary by base 
 
• There is unconstrained repair capability 
 
• There is no lateral resupply for the deployed weapon system 
 
• All aircraft deployed to a single location are identical 
 
• Cannibalization from other aircraft is allowed with spares consolidation on as few 
aircraft as possible 
 
• Cannibalization is done on the entire LRU (Anderson, 2003:6-6) 
 
In addition to being the backbone of the Aircraft Sustainability Model, the Dyna-
METRIC model has also been incorporated into two other Air Force systems: the 
Sustainability Assessment Model (SAM) and the Dyna-METRIC Microcomputer 
Analysis System (DMAS).  Both systems, with both sortie and aircraft availability 
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estimation capabilities, can provide a unit or theater level assessment of combat readiness 
(DAF, 2004:Ch. 14, 51).   
Aircraft Sustainability Model 
The Logistics Management Institute (LMI) developed the Aircraft Sustainability 
Model (ASM) specifically for the Air Force to “compute [an] optimal spares mix to 
support a wide range of possible operating scenarios” (Slay et al, 1996:iii).  The goal of 
the ASM is the same as that of the analytical Dyna-METRIC model--to maximize aircraft 
availability.  However, it also factors in the purchase cost of spares required to reach a 
desired aircraft availability goal over a specific coverage period.  The ASM has the same 
assumptions as the Dyna-METRIC model, but it also allows for the inclusion of different 
operational goals and constraints, as well as weapon system component characteristics in 
the spares mix computation. 
Military planners must calculate spares requirements to support weapon system 
readiness over a wide range of possible situations.  Using the operational 
parameters of those situations and the characteristics of the weapon system’s 
components—including projected failure rates, repair times, and procurement 
costs—the ASM computes cost-effective spares mixes to minimize waiting time 
for spare parts.  (Slay et al, 1996:1-1) 
 
Although aircraft availability and purchase cost are the major factors, there are 
seven other factors that are considered in the ASM. 
• Item type (reparable item vs. consumable item) 
• Indenture structure (LRU vs. SRU) 
• Operating environment (dynamic vs. steady state) 
• Common items (items common to more than one aircraft series or type) 
• Cannibalization (allowing consolidation of broken spares on a single aircraft) 
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• Item stock considerations (include existing/back ordered items) 
• Other factors (item specific factors to include item failure rates, repair times, 
quantity per application and lead time)  (Kline et al, 2002:1-3) 
By incorporating additional variables, the ASM assessment analysis gives logistical 
planners a broader view than would be available from considering just cost and aircraft 
availability. 
The ASM then uses a marginal analysis approach, ranking possible additions to 
the inventory in terms of their probable benefit to aircraft availability divided by 
their procurement cost.  Spares that have the greatest benefit per dollar appear at 
the top of this “shopping list”.  Accumulated costs and resulting aircraft 
availability are tracked as the shopping list is formed to provide a curve relating 
overall funding and projected availability.  (Slay et al, 1996:iv) 
 
The ability of the ASM to create this “shopping list” that lies along a cost curve, as seen 
in Figure 1 (Kline et al, 2002:1-1), gives military logisticians two ways to consider which 
spares to purchase: they can either use a budget constraint to purchase a maximum level 
of projected aircraft availability, or determine budget requirements by selecting a desired 
level of aircraft availability.  In stocking MRSPs, the latter method is used.  The aircraft 
availability level used in the ASM is called a direct support objective. 
 
Figure 1.  Availability vs. Cost Curve 
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Direct Support Objective 
The direct support objective (DSO) is “the point in the spares computation at 
which sufficient quantities are available to support the sorties of the unit’s wartime 
tasking” (DAF, 2004:Ch. 14, 23).  In other words, it is the minimum number of fully 
mission capable aircraft required at the end of the support period. DSOs can vary by 
aircraft type and mission.  Fighter aircraft are allowed to use dual DSOs, one for the 
“surge period” or the beginning of the contingency when aircraft usage and breakage is at 
its peak, and another for the remaining “support period”.  The DSO is generally 
computed by multiplying the number of primary aircraft required for the mission (PMAI) 
by a specific percentage.  Table 1 lists the percentages used to formulate the DSO (DAF, 
2004:Ch. 14, 23). 
Table 1.  Percentages for Computing the DSO 
Special Operation 83% 
Tactical  Airlift 83% 
Strategic Airlift 93% 
Helicopters 83% 
E-3, E-4, E-8 83% 
Bombers (including F-117) 83% 
Tankers 83% 
Fighters (default minimum) 83% 
 
Dual DSOs for fighter aircraft can be computed using a different formula, so long 
as the result is not less than the default minimum listed above.  Each DSO is computed 
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using the PMAI, the desired sortie rate, the maximum turn rate, and the number of spare 
aircraft available to perform the mission:  
DSO = PMAI * SORTIE RATE/MAX TURN RATE + # of spare aircraft 
 The inverse of the DSO (1 – DSO), called the non-mission capable supply (NMCS) 
target, is the number used in the ASM as the aircraft availability portion to determine the 
optimal number of spares for the MRSP within the designated constraints in addition to 
cost.   
D087G System  
The D087G system is formally known as the classified portion of the 
Requirements Execution Availability Logistics Module (REALM) in the Weapon System 
Management Information System (WSMIS).  Using the ASM, The D087G and D087H 
(unclassified) systems “support the development and maintenance of RSPs, compute the 
item requirements to support unit taskings, and provide the basis for buy and repair 
budgeting in support of RSPs” (DAF, 2004:Ch. 14, 24).  Spares requirements used in the 
D087G come from the Minimum Essential Subsystem List (MESL) for the weapon 
system, a listing of subsystems that, when broken, would generate a non-mission capable 
grounding condition (DAF, 2004:Ch. 14, 7). 
MRSP Effectiveness 
Before evaluating the effectiveness of MRSPs during Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM (OIF), it was important to know what constitutes a healthy or effective 
MRSP.  MRSP contingency effectiveness literature was found in two general areas:  
evaluating MRSP performance for the entire duration of a contingency, not just the initial 
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30 day support period; or evaluating aggregate MRSP composition and performance 
across weapon systems.  A discussion of some of those writings is at the beginning of this 
section.  
There has recently been a surge in military supply chain effectiveness literature.  
If one looks at an MRSP as a portable warehouse with limited stock and a dedicated retail 
customer-base, one can easily accept it as a very compact supply chain.  A decision was 
made to define MRSP effectiveness by using select elements found in the literature that 
constitute an effective supply chain.  This section concludes with a discussion of those 
writings and what the authors believe are the most critical measures for supply chain 
managers to watch. 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 
In January 2004, the Plans and Programs directorate of Air Force Material 
Command headquarters (HQ AFMC/XP) generated a presentation for internal AFMC 
logistics management titled Analysis of Deployment Kits for Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM.  The author looked at the aggregated total of 84 MRSPs for 17 different 
weapon systems and compared the actual demands during the first 30 days of the 
operation with the actual MRSP spares inventories as computed by the ASM.  The key 
elements of evaluation were under prediction and over prediction of item usage from 
three different angles:  range (stock-numbered items); depth (line item totals); and cost.  
Analysis showed over prediction of items far outweighed under prediction, both in range 
and depth, at a cost of over $240 million (Woodrum, 2004:9-10).  Further analysis 
showed a cost difference between the two item categories.  The majority of the top ten 
under predicted items were higher cost items, ranging from $22K to $626.3K.  
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Conversely, the majority of the top ten over predicted items were much lest costly, 
ranging in cost from $209 to $7.3K (Woodrum, 2004:13).  Woodrum hypothesized on the 
range between the demand and cost of over-predicted items. 
While over-predicted demands were six times that of under-predicted 
demands, the same is not true with demand costs.  The cost of over-predicted 
demands was three times that of the cost of under-predicted items.  This could 
mean a lot of the items being over-predicted are low cost items.  (Woodrum, 
2002:16) 
 
Woodrum’s broad analysis of MRSP performance showed there is a definite gap between 
what is taken in a MRSP and what is actually used from it during the initial 30 days of a 
contingency.  However, by looking at effectiveness across multiple MRSPs for multiple 
weapon systems, the only measures suitable for such an aggregation were general item 
usage and total cost.  Woodrum was unable to look at other effectiveness measures that 
would be revealed by analyzing performance at a lower level of aggregation.  The next 
two reports also offer analyses of MRSP effectiveness for multiple MRSPs, but only for a 
single weapon system. 
Operation ALLIED FORCE 
In April 2000, two Air Command and Staff College graduate research reports 
focused on MRSP support during Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF) in Kosovo.  Two 
different weapon systems, the KC-135 and the E-3, were examined using different 
readiness indicators to determine successful weapon system support. 
In the report Examination of E-3 AWACS Readiness Spares Kit Adequacy During 
Operation Allied Force, David McCormick focused two indicators.  The first readiness 
indicator was the aggregate totals of mission-capable rates for the entire weapon system 
inventory throughout 1999 compared to those incurred during the 78-day conflict.  The 
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second readiness indicator was average annual RSP fill rates, also for the entire weapon 
system inventory.  McCormick concluded that E-3 MRSP performance was artificially 
boosted for two reasons.  First, the E-3 fleet has an activity called the Sentry Control 
Point.  Located at Tinker Air Force Base, its primary function is “to provide a single 
point of providing and coordinating positive logistical support for the widely dispersed E-
3 fleet” (McCormick, 2000:10).  Second, the NATO E-3 system at Geilenkirchen Air 
Base, which did not operate under a lean logistics approach, maintained high levels of 
spares from which U.S. E-3 supply personnel were able to borrow (McCormick, 
2000:15).  According to McCormick, “the bigger challenge is not in designing MRSPs, 
but rather keeping them stocked to authorized levels” (McCormick, 2000:18). 
In the report Improving Wartime Spares Support to AMC: An Analysis of KC-135 
Readiness Spares Packages During Operation Allied Force With a Look to the Future 
and Support of the Aerospace Expeditionary Force, Jon Larvick examined four customer 
service measures—fill rate, stockage effectiveness, issue effectiveness, and aircraft 
availability—to analyze MRSP support for the entire OAF duration. Larvick concluded 
that high stockage and issue effectiveness rates, boosted by expedited depot response for 
both repairs and backorders, were able to offset initially low fill rates (Larvick, 2000:22).  
However, the final aircraft availability rate of 77% was less than the 83% expected rate.  
Larvick was unable to provide any comprehensive data for this lower rate, but he argued 
that initial MRSP fill rate, extended sortie durations due to tanker basing locations, and 
higher than expected tanker usage rates contributed to the lower rate (Larvick, 2000:19-
20). 
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While both of these research papers addressed MRSP effectiveness in terms of 
customer support, the focus was on MRSP support during the entire 78-day period of the 
campaign. Also, both scenarios relied on resupply and other spares support throughout 
the operation.  Finally, both researchers focused on aggregate fleet performance.  MRSPs 
are designed to meet a DSO for a specific PMAI for the first 30 days of a conflict without 
resupply.  By focusing on this limited period of time and limited number of aircraft, a 
truer picture of MRSP support could be formulated.   
One customer support metric looked at by both Larvick and McCormick was total 
weapon system aircraft availability at the end of the conflict.  Although aircraft 
availability is widely considered to be the ultimate goal of any Air Force supply chain, 
neither researcher was able to definitively tie the other support metrics used to aircraft 
availability.  The scope of this research is also limited in its ability to provide such a link.  
However, there is a body of literature that defines the measures and metrics logistics 
leaders should be watching and analyzing to ensure aircraft availability goals are met. 
 Logistics Management Institute 
Several years ago, Department of Defense (DoD) leadership recognized a 
problem with supply process measurements. 
Performance measures, or “metrics,” are used to monitor the progress of supply 
chain initiatives.  However, a consensus in DoD considers the metrics available to 
senior DoD managers to be inadequate or lacking the depth to measure the 
effectiveness of the DoD supply chain.  The metrics are not “balanced” across 
customer service, cost, readiness, and sustainability performance objectives.  
(Klapper et al, 1999:1-1) 
 
At the request of the DoD, The Logistics Management Institute (LMI) developed 
nine metrics that provided a “balanced scorecard” or meaningful measurements balanced 
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across the three key supply chain objectives; customer satisfaction, cost, and readiness 
and sustainability. 
• Perfect order fulfillment – aggregation of measures the customer considers 
important (on time, right quantity, acceptable quality, adequate paperwork)  
 
• Supply chain response time – total length of the supply chain measured in days 
 
• Percent change in customer price compared to inflation – compares how well 
procurement initiatives are keeping prices low with overall supply chain 
management efficiency 
 
• Supply chain management costs as a percent of sales (at standard price) – all costs 
associated with operating a supply chain as a percent of the value of the assets 
moving through it 
 
• Weapon system logistics costs as a percent of the acquisition price – captures costs 
reductions created by reliability and maintainability improvements 
 
• Inventory Turns – measures productivity of the inventory investment and efficiency 
of the supply chain 
 
• Weapon system not mission capable (NMC) rates – percent of time a weapon 
system fleet is NMCS, NMCM, or both 
 
• Upside production flexibility – number of days needed to achieve a sustainable 
increase to support a two-major theater war scenario 
 
• War reserve ratio – measures the ratio of on-hand war reserve assets to the war 
reserve requirement  (Klapper et al, 1999:1-3) 
 
These performance measures are at the DoD logistics system level.  The next sections 
detail efforts at the Air Force level to define measures used in determining Air Force 
supply chain effectiveness. 
Air Force Logistics Management Agency 
In 2000, the Director of Supply (AF/IL) tasked the Air Force Logistics 
Management Agency (AFLMA) to “develop a set of performance measures or metrics 
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that represent the health of supply at an aggregate level” (Manship, 2001:1) after 
recognizing there were problems with the supply process measurement process.   
The measurements AFLMA developed were designed to address three key 
problems.  First, there was a lack of systems perspective that encouraged the making of 
inventory reduction decisions without considering the tradeoff for weapon system 
availability or mission capability rates.  Next, there was too much emphasis on 
“secondary metrics” with no link to the primary AF goal of aircraft availability.  Finally, 
there was a lack of information for supply chain managers to make tradeoff decisions 
between buy and repair actions with limited funding allocated to reach an aircraft 
availability goal (Manship, 2001:1).  
In 2000, AFLMA developed 26 AF/IL approved aggregate metrics that determine 
how well a supply system is performing (Manship, 2001:10).  These performance 
measures are focused on one key output measure—aircraft availability, at both the unit 
and Air Force level.  Although there are 26 specific metrics, there are eight key process 
areas that they represent.   
• Repair Effectiveness – identifies the ability to repair to meet needs and near term 
future support 
 
• Buy Effectiveness – identifies the accuracy of buying what is needed to meet the 
worldwide demand 
 
• Stockage/Distribution Effectiveness – identifies excess assets and customer 
support timeliness 
 
• System Effectiveness – identifies data system and data integrity problems 
 
• Manning Effectiveness – measures supply manning levels and identifies assigned 
vs. authorized shortages 
 
• Sales Effectiveness – measures sales compared to forecasted requirements 
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• Funding Effectiveness – compares cost per flying hour requirements against both  
D200A (Requirements Management System) requirements and available funding 
 
• DLA Responsiveness – measures supply availability through issue and stockage 
effectiveness and aircraft grounding (MICAP) incidents and hours based on 
commodity and by base (Manship, 2001:8-26) 
 
These aggregate metrics proposed by AFLMA provide a “set of corporate AF supply 
measures that link each segment of supply to the corporate AF goals” (Manship, 2001:3).  
They do not provide, however, a range of performance values against which to measure 
effectiveness.  The next section describes AFMC efforts to provide both. 
Air Force Material Command 
In 2003 Air Force Material Command (AFMC) published the AFMC Supply 
Chain Metrics Guide as an official reference guide for supply chain management to use 
to “transform a seemingly limitless amount of data into meaningful and useful 
measurements to guide sustainment operations” (Koenig, 2003:4).  As do LMI and 
AFLMA, AFMC recognizes the link between meaningful measurements and 
process/performance improvement. 
This guide illustrates the metric linkage to AFMC supply processes and identifies 
business rules, targets, algorithms, reporting standards, evaluation methods and 
follow-on analysis recommendations. The AFMC metrics help deliver the proper 
process-linked and customer-focused analysis needed to manage supply activities 
and ensure AFMC is getting “…the right part, to the right place, at the right time, 
at the right price.  (Koenig, 2003:5) 
 
AFMC makes a distinction between two categories of metrics—performance 
measures and process indicators (Koenig, 2003:8).  Performance measures are reported 
externally and is data that “indicate the strengths and opportunities for improvement in an 
organization” by highlighting measurements of organizational effectiveness, customer 
satisfaction, and cost effectiveness (Koenig, 2003:8).  Process indicators are reported 
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internally to “provide information about or contribute to the understanding of a process” 
and “are used in root cause analysis of deviations in performance” (Koenig, 2003:8).  
Like AFLMA, AFMC links its six process indicators and three performance measures to 
the ultimate performance measure of aircraft availability, “the best measure of support to 
the warfighter and the key input to the requirements process” (Koenig, 2003:6).  The ten 
measures AFMC advocates are as follows: 
• Aircraft Availability (Performance) – percentage of time an aircraft is unavailable 
due to supply 
 
• MICAP Hours (Performance) – measurement of the hours accrued in a given 
month for items affecting mission capability that are on backorder 
 
• Customer Wait Time (Performance) – days measuring the average time between 
issuance of a warfighter order and receipt 
 
• Net Operating Result (Performance) – the difference between revenue and 
expenses or a bottom line profit and loss indicator 
 
• Total Requirements Variance (Process) – evaluation of expected backorders vs. 
actual due outs 
 
• MICAP Incidents (Process) – measurement of the number of incidents based on 
the number of MICAP requisitions accumulated 
 
• Backorders (Process) – number of demands placed on the supply system that can 
not be immediately satisfied from existing inventory (including stock 
replenishment) 
 
• Issue Effectiveness (Process) – measure of supply account’s ability to satisfy any 
customer demand 
 
• Stockage Effectiveness (Process) – measure of supply account’s ability to satisfy 
customer demand for authorized stockage items 
 
• Logistics Response Time (Process) – days measuring the average time between 
issuance of a warfighter/base/depot retail order and receipt at base/depot supply 
(Koenig, 2003:9) 
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In addition to a description of each performance measure, AFMC provides a data source 
for obtaining the metric measures and annual performance targets for each supply chain 
management program in AFMC.  This connection between metrics and performance 
targets is the final step in determining the effectiveness of a supply chain. 
This research looked at an MRSP as a ‘supply chain in a box’ for a single 
customer over a specific period of time.  Using these criteria, the metrics proposed by 
LMI and AFLMA encompass both higher levels of support and higher support objectives 
than appropriate for this research.  However, the AFMC Supply Chain Metrics Guide 
provided two things.  First, the metrics advocated by AFMC provided the most 
appropriate level of measuring MRSP effectiveness.  Second, the guide included 
numerous sources of performance data and comparison metrics.  Both were key elements 
to answering the proposed research and investigative questions. 
Summary 
This literature review presented information that explains the background of the 
analysis that was conducted in this research effort.  First, it described the main 
components of MRSP configuration.  Next it explored three recent research efforts that 
examined MRSP effectiveness during contingency operations.  Finally, it examined 
literature that attempted to define the elements of an effective supply chain from DoD, 
corporate Air Force, and functional MAJCOM levels.  The next chapter discusses the 
methodology used to conduct the research. 
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III. Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the tools and techniques used to answer 
the investigative questions central to the research objective of this thesis.  First is a 
summary of the problem.  Second is a description of the measures selected to show 
MRSP effectiveness.  Next is an examination of the data obtained and the analysis tools 
used.  Finally this chapter ends with a summary of the topics covered. 
Problem Summary 
The purpose of this research is to determine whether the current method of 
configuring MRSPs provided effective support in the actual wartime scenario of 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).  This is a good place to restate the investigative 
questions and sub-questions that will answer the research question. 
1. How were MRSPs configured for OIF? 
 
2. Did MRSPs effectively support the weapon systems during the first 30 days of 
operations? 
 
a. Did the MRSPs have enough spares for aircraft maintenance personnel to 
keep aircraft mission capable?  In other words, did we take what was 
needed to the conflict? 
 
b. Did the MRSPs have the right spares for aircraft maintenance personnel to 
keep aircraft mission capable?  In other words, did we need what we took 
to the conflict? 
 
The next sections will provide a discussion of the selected effectiveness measures and the 
data required to answer these questions. 
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Selected Measures 
As discussed in Chapter two, the Air Force uses a number of measures to 
determine whether a supply function provides effective support to a weapon system.  
When looking at an MRSP as a portable supply account, the measures selected to show 
MRSP effectiveness were mission capability spares (MICAP) incidents, fill rate, issue 
effectiveness, stockage effectiveness, and total requirements variance for both MRSP cost 
and spares used.  Out of the available measures that can be used to determine supply 
chain effectiveness, these six metrics are critical in showing how MRSP composition in 
particular enables effective support to a weapon system.  In other words, these metrics 
will show whether the MRSP met the supply chain goal of “getting the right part, to the 
right place, at the right time, at the right price” (Koenig, 2003:4).  The next sections 
provide a description of each measure and a justification for how its selection helps 
answer the second investigative question. 
Mission Capable Spares 
Mission capability is whether a weapon system is able to perform its designated 
function.  There are two types of mission capability that can be attributed to the MRSPs 
during a contingency.  Not Mission Capable Supply (NMCS) means the weapon system 
is unable to perform any assigned missions due to a lack of parts in the MRSP.  Partially 
Mission Capable Supply (PMCS) means the weapon system can perform at least one of 
its missions based on a basic system list but not all missions due to a lack of parts 
availability for systems on other mission essential subsystem lists. 
In an NMCS or PMCS situation, the critical part preventing the aircraft from 
mission performance is referred to as a mission capable asset or spare (MICAP).  MICAP 
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hours are accumulated from the time maintenance places an order in the supply system 
for the critical asset until the replacement asset is delivered to maintenance for repair 
action.  Because there is an assumption of no MRSP resupply during the first 30 days of a 
contingency, a MICAP could cause serious problems with aircraft availability.  First, the 
very lack of asset availability to repair the aircraft is a problem.  Second, the amount of 
time utilized to bring the weapon system out of NMCS or PMCS status could be lengthy, 
especially in a contingency situation where resupply and repair facilities may not be 
comparable to those of a state-side facility. 
Although contingency MICAPs are filled as priority due outs, the number of 
MICAPS for a weapon system speaks directly to effective MRSP composition in two 
ways.  First, MICAPs for items authorized to be in the MRSP are a reflection of the right 
number of spares.  Second, MICAPs for items not authorized to be in the MRSP are a 
refection of the right kind of spares. 
Fill Rate 
Fill rate is the percentage of authorized spares actually on hand in a MRSP.  Fill 
rate is a function of several factors:  how often spares are utilized, how often MRSP 
replenishment occurs, and how many authorized spares were actually in the MRSP at the 
time of deployment.  The fill rate is determined by the ratio of available spares to 
authorized spares. 
Because there is an assumption of no MRSP resupply during the first 30 days of a 
contingency, it is not surprising that the fill rate of a MRSP will decline over time.  The 
level of declination however, is another reflection of MRSP effectiveness.  A fill rate that 
declines slowly, coupled with a large number of MICAPs, means the MRSP may not 
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contain the right kind of spares.  However, a fill rate that declines rapidly, coupled with a 
large number of MICAPs, means the MRSP may not contain the right number of spares. 
Issue and Stockage Effectiveness 
Both issue and stockage effectiveness (I/E and S/E) are weapon system support 
measures that reflect demand fulfillment.  Just like fill rate, issue and stockage 
effectiveness are functions of MRSP utilization, replenishment actions, and spares on 
hand.  Unlike fill rate, issue and stockage effectiveness are also affected by the number of 
spares a MRSP does not have in stock. 
Issue effectiveness is the percentage of customer requests actually filled by items 
in the MRSP.  Issue effectiveness is calculated by dividing the number of items issued by 
the number of items issued plus backorders, both authorized and not authorized to stock.  
Stockage effectiveness is the percentage of total spares authorized in the MRSP that are 
available upon customer request.  Stockage effectiveness is calculated by dividing the 
number of items issued by the number of items issued plus authorized backorders only. 
While stockage effectiveness is generally higher than issue effectiveness, issue 
effectiveness is more representative of actual customer support because it includes the 
total number of customer requirements.  As MRSP effectiveness measures, each one 
indicates a different kind of MRSP performance.  Issue effectiveness mainly reflects 
whether the MRSP contains the right kind of stock is available.  Stockage effectiveness 
mainly reflects whether the MRSP contains the right amount of stock 
Total Requirements Variance 
In the traditional supply chain, total requirements variance (TRV) is the difference 
between expected back orders (EBO) and actual due outs (ADO).  Because MRSPs are 
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calculated based on the probability of requiring certain reparables, it is not unreasonable 
to look at the authorized contents of a MRSP as EBOs.  For this research, TRV was 
defined as the difference between what was authorized in the MRSP and what was used 
from the MRSP.  This variance was shown using both the number of assets and the total 
cost of the assets. 
Unlike the other MRSP effectiveness measures, TRV is not a measure of direct 
customer support.  Instead, it is a performance measure that reflects whether the process 
used to stock the MRSP generated an accurate “shopping list” of what was needed.  TRV 
shows not only how much of the MRSP was unused at the end of the 30-day period, but 
also the cost of over-allocated assets that are unavailable for use elsewhere in the supply 
chain. 
Data, Sources, and Assumptions 
This research is focused on MRSP effectiveness during OIF.  As such, three 
different types of data sets were required to perform the necessary research: one to show 
MRSP configuration; one to show MRSP content; and one to show MRSP support.  Data 
was collected from several Air Force databases to provide the data for analysis.   
First, to show MRSP configuration, MRSP management at Air Combat Command 
(ACC/LGSWC) provided confirmation of MRSP configuration according to WMP-5 
requirements for the 52 MRSPs and eight contingency high priority mission support kits 
(CHPMSK) under their management.  Specifically, the three deployed MRSPs selected 
for analysis were configured according to WMP-5 requirements. 
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Second, to show MRSP content, a listing of authorized MRSP line items for each 
weapon system was required.  This data was obtained in a text file from the D087G.   The 
data was then imported into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to extract the required data 
elements.  MRSP composition data from three different forward-deployed weapon 
system types was extracted.  For the purposes of limiting the potential for obtaining 
results from a MRSP that was used to support more than its designated squadron at a 
single location, MRSP selection was limited to weapon systems that were the only one of 
its kind at a location.  For example, MRSP parts for a C-130 would be highly unlikely to 
be cross utilized on an F-15.  Table 2 shows the weapon system and deployed location 
obtained from the stock record account number (SRAN) listed with each kit on a listing 
of deployed RSPs provided by ACC/LGSWC. 
Table 2.  Weapon System Location 
Weapon System Deployed Location 
E-3B Thumrait Sultanate, Oman 
F-16C Al Jaber, Kuwait 
HC-130P Azraq, Jordan 
 
Finally, to show MRSP support, data records showing MRSP issues and back 
orders during the contingency period provided the necessary information.  This data came 
from two sources.  First, Air Force demand data from 19 March to 17 April 2003 was 
obtained for the three specific weapon systems supported by the MRSPs from the 
Standard Base Supply System (SBSS) D002A transaction report function in a text file.  
The data was imported into several Microsoft Excel spreadsheets by national stock 
number blocks where it was segregated first by SRAN, then by organization code, which 
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indicated the maintenance organization that utilized the MRSP spares.  Second, Air Force 
MICAP data for the same time period was obtained from the MICAP Requisition Status 
Reporting System (D165B) in a Microsoft Access file.  The data was imported into 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheets by month where it was segregated first by SRAN, then by 
weapon system to extract the relevant MICAP data. 
Assumptions and Limitations 
Because of the multiple data sources used in this research and the nature of the 
spares computed by the D087G, several assumptions and limitations were necessary: 
1. Data from the SBSS, D165B and D087G are complete and accurate for the 
specified weapon systems. 
 
2. Data from the D165B was only available in a monthly format.  The request 
date for an item was extracted from the document identification number as a 
Julian date to correspond with the daily format of the metrics.   
 
3. Each MRSP began OIF with a 100% fill rate.  This assumption is made for 
two reasons.  First, it is reasonable to assume that before a MRSP deploys on 
a contingency operation, it will be robusted to full capacity through local 
supply channels and maintenance cannibalization actions.  Second, data is not 
available concerning any maintenance actions taken en-route to a deployed 
location, which would cause a fill rate drop as part of the deployment but 
before the contingency began. 
 
4. Most MRSPs contain items that are not listed on the D087G report because 
they cannot be computed or are incompatible with a flying hour program.  
This research was limited to analyzing those repairable spares that were 
computed, authorized, and assigned a stock level using the ASM in the 
D087G.  This was done by first exporting each Excel spreadsheet into 
Microsoft Access.  Next, the NSN of each issue, due out, or MICAP was 
matched against the NSNs for authorized spares on the D087G listing. 
Metrics Methodology 
Authorization, issue, and MICAP data was extracted from various databases.  The 
next step was to use the extracted weapon system data to develop the proposed 
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effectiveness metrics.  The following methods were employed to compute fill rate, issue 
effectiveness, stockage effectiveness, mission capability spares rates, and total 
requirements variance. 
Fill Rate 
Fill rate was computed on a daily basis.  Only spares authorized by the D087G 
were used in the fill rate computation.  The number of authorized spares unavailable for 
issue each day as reported in the SBSS transaction report was subtracted from the total 
number of authorized spares with a positive stockage level.  This figure was then divided 
by the total number of authorized spares with a positive stockage level as recorded on the 
D087G report.  
Issue and Stockage Effectiveness 
Issue effectiveness was computed on a daily basis.  The number of authorized 
spares with a positive stockage level that issued each day from the MRSP as reported in 
the SBSS transaction report was divided by the same number plus the total number of 
backorders (MICAPS) recorded on the same day on the D165B report.   
Stockage effectiveness was also computed on a daily basis.  The number of 
authorized spares with a positive stockage level that were issued each day as reported on 
the SBSS transaction report was divided by the same number plus only those MICAPS 
recorded on the D165B report with an authorized stockage level recorded on the D087G 
report.   
Mission Capability Spares 
MICAP data for each weapon system from the D165B was recorded on a daily 
basis.  The daily record was compared with the MRSP authorization listing from the 
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D087G to determine whether or not the MICAP was authorized in the MRSP.  The total 
number of MICAPS was computed for the end of the 30-day period. 
Total Requirements Variance 
Total requirements variance was computed using the item cost and requirement 
quantity data from the D087G report and the issue data from the SBSS transaction report.  
To compute asset TRV, the total number of authorized issued assets was subtracted from 
the total number of line items authorized in the MRSP.  To compute cost TRV, 
authorized issued assets were multiplied by item cost, then subtracted from the product of 
authorized issued assets and item cost. 
Metrics Application 
After computing cumulative effectiveness measures for each weapon system 
during the first 30 days of OIF, the first four measurements were compared against 
overall weapon system supply chain performance during different available time periods.  
Performance measures were obtained from multiple data reporting sources to provide 
comparison data.   
Fill rate was compared with average fill rates for OIF weapon system MRSPs 
during the time period 0300 Zulu 19 March to 0259 Zulu 18 April 2003.  This 
information was provided by the Assessment and Analysis Division of Central Command 
Air Forces (CENTAF) in the 2003 report Operation IRAQI FREEDOM—By The 
Numbers.  
Issue and stockage effectiveness measures were compared with two measures. 
First, they were compared with average issue and stockage effectiveness rates during the 
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months of March and April 2003 obtained from historical SBSS issue and stockage 
effectiveness data archived on the U.S. Air Force Installations and Logistics (HQ 
USAF/IL) Multi-Echelon Resource Logistics Information Network (MERLIN) system.  
Second, they were compared with 2003 AFMC issue and stockage effectiveness goals 
listed in the FY2003 Supply Management Mission Area Operating Plan.  
There is no metric available against which to compare MICAP incidents.  Instead, 
the comparison was made between MICAPS for authorized MRSP assets and MICAPS 
for unauthorized MRSP assets.  The distinction was made by comparing the total number 
of weapon system MICAPs obtained from the D165B report with the D087G report of 
authorized MRSP assets. 
There is no metric available against which to compare total requirements 
variance.  Instead, the comparison was made between both the number and the cost of 
used and unused assets. 
Summary 
This chapter discusses the process used to conduct the analysis required to answer 
the research question.  After a summary of the problem statement, a description of and 
justification for selected effectiveness measures was provided.  Next, data sources and 
limitations were discussed.  The methods used to compute the selected measures were 
then explained.  Finally, this chapter discussed how the computed metrics would be 
analyzed.  The next chapter presents the results of the analysis. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the results of the data collection and analysis.  This chapter 
is organized by aircraft type—E-3B, F-16C, and HC-130P.  Each section begins with an 
overview of the MRSP deployed for the aircraft, including total number of items and 
cost.  The next section contains the MRSP performance metrics selected in Chapter 
three—fill rate, issue effectiveness, stockage effectiveness, mission capable spares 
(MICAPs), and total requirements variance (TRV) for both items and cost.  The chapter 
ends with a summary of the analysis and results. 
E-3B MRSP Results 
MRSP Composition: The data from the D087G provided a listing of each item 
considered for inclusion in the MRSP.  Elements included stock number, quantity per 
application (QPA), cost per item, and authorized requirement quantity.  Table 3 shows a 
summary of the configuration of the E-3B MRSP.  The first row shows information on 
the items loaded into the D087G from the Mission Essential Subsystem List (MESL).  
The second row shows information on the items actually selected by the ASM for 
inclusion in the MRSP.  The first column shows the total number of stock number items 
either considered or selected.  The second column shows the total number of line items 
either considered or selected.  The last column shows the total cost of the MRSP 
calculated by the sum of the products of cost per item and total number of line items 
either considered or selected.  In this case, even though the number of stock number 
items decreased between units considered and units selected, the number of line items 
 
33 
and the total cost increased.  This is a result of the ASM assigning a higher number of 
line items to particular stock numbers than was required by the MESL.  Consequently, 
the cost of those additional line items is reflected in the higher total cost. 
Table 3.  Configuration of E-3B MRSP  
 Stock Number Items Line Items Total Cost 
Units Considered 287 805 $39,468,004.08 
Units Selected 279 854 $ 40,537,174.24 
 
MRSP Performance:  Fill rate, issue effectiveness, and stockage effectiveness 
were calculated from the demand data captured from the D002A and the D165B using the 
methods described in the last chapter.  Table 4 shows the results of those calculations.  
Table 4.  Performance Metrics for E-3B MRSP 
FILLED 
AUTHORIZED ITEM 
REQ
AVAILABLE KIT 
LINE ITEMS FILL RATE
AUTHORIZED ITEM 
MICAPS
TOTAL 
MICAPS I/E S/E
19-Mar-03 0 845 1.000 0 0 1.000 1.000
20-Mar-03 1 844 0.999 0 2 0.333 1.000
21-Mar-03 0 844 0.999 0 0 0.333 1.000
22-Mar-03 0 844 0.999 0 0 0.333 1.000
23-Mar-03 0 844 0.999 0 0 0.333 1.000
24-Mar-03 2 842 0.996 0 0 0.600 1.000
25-Mar-03 4 838 0.992 0 0 0.778 1.000
26-Mar-03 0 838 0.992 0 0 0.778 1.000
27-Mar-03 2 836 0.989 0 0 0.818 1.000
28-Mar-03 0 836 0.989 0 0 0.818 1.000
29-Mar-03 0 836 0.989 0 0 0.818 1.000
30-Mar-03 4 832 0.985 0 0 0.867 1.000
31-Mar-03 0 832 0.985 0 0 0.867 1.000
1-Apr-03 0 832 0.985 0 0 0.867 1.000
2-Apr-03 1 831 0.983 0 0 0.875 1.000
3-Apr-03 0 831 0.983 0 0 0.875 1.000
4-Apr-03 0 831 0.983 0 0 0.875 1.000
5-Apr-03 0 831 0.983 0 0 0.875 1.000
6-Apr-03 3 828 0.980 0 1 0.850 1.000
7-Apr-03 5 823 0.974 0 0 0.880 1.000
8-Apr-03 5 818 0.968 0 0 0.900 1.000
9-Apr-03 1 817 0.967 1 1 0.875 0.966
10-Apr-03 0 817 0.967 0 0 0.875 0.966
11-Apr-03 0 817 0.967 0 0 0.875 0.966
12-Apr-03 0 817 0.967 0 0 0.875 0.966
13-Apr-03 5 812 0.961 0 0 0.892 0.971
14-Apr-03 0 812 0.961 0 0 0.892 0.971
15-Apr-03 1 811 0.960 0 0 0.895 0.971
16-Apr-03 0 811 0.960 0 0 0.895 0.971
17-Apr-03 0 811 0.960 0 0 0.895 0.971
TOTALS 34 1 4  
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At the end of the 30-day period, 34 items were issued from the MRSP resulting in 
a 96% fill rate.  There was only one MICAP for an item authorized in the MRSP and 
three MICAPS for items not authorized in the MRSP for a total of four MICAPS.  The 
ratio between issues and authorized item MICAPS resulted in a stockage effectiveness of 
97.1%.  The ratio of issues and total MICAPS resulted in an issue effectiveness of 89.5%.  
The comparisons of fill rate, issue effectiveness, and stockage effectiveness with 
overall weapon system metrics and goals are shown in Table 5.  The first column shows 
each type of measurement.  The next column shows the measurements for the E-3B 
MRSP.  Each corresponding column pair shows the comparison metric and the difference 
(Delta) between the MRSP measurement and the comparison metric.  Deltas in 
parenthesis represent a negative difference. 
Table 5.  MRSP Measures vs. Comparison Metrics 
 MRSP OIF E-3 Total Delta 
AFMC 
2003 Goal Delta 
2003 E-3 
Total Delta 
Fill Rate 96% 96.6% (.6%) --- --- --- --- 
I/E 89.5% --- --- 50% 39.5% 80.3% 9.2% 
S/E 97.1% --- --- 62% 35.1% 90.7% 6.4% 
 
Total requirements variance is shown in Table 6.  The first row shows totals for 
the number of items in the MRSP and the cost of those items.  The second row shows 
totals for the number of items issued from the MRSP during the 30-day period and the 
cost of those items.  The last row shows the difference between the first and second rows. 
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Table 6.  Total Requirements Variance of E-3B MRSP 
 Number of Items Total Cost 
Line Items Available 845 $ 40,537,174.24 
Line Items Used 34 $ 1,562,505.81  
TRV 811 $ 38,974,668.43 
 
Analysis:  Of the 845 line items stocked in this MRSP, 34 were issued during the 
first 30 days of OIF.  The ending fill rate of 96% is only .6% less than the cumulative fill 
rates for all E-3 aircraft participating in OIF.  In other words, this MRSP filled five more 
requisitions than the average E-3 MRSP. 
MICAPs for unauthorized parts were higher than authorized part MICAPS.  With 
three of the four MICAPs being for parts not authorized in the MRSP, 75% of the 
MICAPs were for parts not listed on the MESL as critical grounding spares.  However, 
the overall MICAP rate was low with respect to actual MRSP issues.  With 34 issues for 
authorized parts and four total MICAPs for unavailable parts, 89.5% of reparable item 
needs were met by the MRSP. 
Issue effectiveness rates for this MRSP compared favorably with the AFMC E-3 
goals and the 2003 calendar year supply chain total rates.  This MRSP beat the AFMC 
goal by 39.5% and the 2003 rate by 9.2%.  This means that this E-3B MRSP provided 
more of the right spares to meet demand requirements than expected. 
Stockage effectiveness rates for this MRSP also compared favorably with 
aggregate metrics and goals.  This MRSP beat the AFMC goal by 35.1% and the 2003 
rate by 6.4%.  This means that this E-3B MRSP had more of the authorized spares to 
meet demand requirements than expected.  
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The total requirements variance showed that of the 845 items stocked in the 
MRSP, 811 items were still in the MRSP at the end of the 30-day period.  This means 
only 4% of the MRSP was actually required.  The total cost of the MRSP showed a 
variance of $38,974,668 between the cost of items stocked and the cost of items used.  
This means the MRSP contained over 25 times the value of the items actually issued to 
repair the weapon systems. 
F-16C MRSP Results 
MRSP Composition: The data from the D087G provided a listing of each item 
considered for inclusion in the MRSP.  Elements included stock number, quantity per 
application (QPA), cost per item, and authorized requirement quantity.  Table 7 shows a 
summary of the configuration of the F-16C MRSP.  The first row shows information on 
the items loaded into the D087G from the Mission Essential Subsystem List (MESL).  
The second row shows information on the items actually selected by the ASM for 
inclusion in the MRSP.  The first column shows the total number of stock number items 
either considered or selected.  The second column shows the total number of line items 
either considered or selected.  The last column shows the total cost of the MRSP 
calculated by the sum of the products of cost per item and total number of line items 
either considered or selected. 
Table 7.  Configuration of F-16C MRSP 
 Stock Number Items Line Items Total Cost 
Units Considered 271 356 $12,945,305.09 
Units Selected 100 174 $ 13,766,422.93 
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In this case, both the number of stock number items and the number of line items 
decreased between units considered and units selected.  However, the total cost increased.  
Again, this is a result of the ASM assigning additional line items to particular stock 
numbers, namely high cost items.  Consequently, the cost of those additional line items is 
reflected in the higher total cost for units selected. 
MRSP Performance:  Fill rate, issue effectiveness, and stockage effectiveness 
were calculated from the demand data captured from the D002A and the D165B using the 
methods described in the last chapter.  Table 8 shows the results of those calculations.  
Table 8.  Performance Metrics for F-16C MRSP 
FILLED 
AUTHORIZED ITEM 
REQ
AVAILABLE KIT 
LINE ITEMS FILL RATE
AUTHORIZED ITEM 
MICAPS
TOTAL 
MICAPS I/E S/E
19-Mar-03 1 173 0.994 0 0 1.000 1.000
20-Mar-03 0 173 0.994 0 0 1.000 1.000
21-Mar-03 0 173 0.994 0 1 0.500 1.000
22-Mar-03 0 173 0.994 1 1 0.333 0.500
23-Mar-03 2 171 0.983 0 0 0.600 0.750
24-Mar-03 0 171 0.983 0 0 0.600 0.750
25-Mar-03 0 171 0.983 0 1 0.500 0.750
26-Mar-03 2 169 0.971 0 0 0.625 0.833
27-Mar-03 2 167 0.960 1 3 0.538 0.778
28-Mar-03 0 167 0.960 1 2 0.467 0.700
29-Mar-03 0 167 0.960 0 1 0.438 0.700
30-Mar-03 1 166 0.954 0 0 0.471 0.727
31-Mar-03 1 165 0.948 0 3 0.429 0.750
1-Apr-03 0 165 0.948 1 1 0.409 0.692
2-Apr-03 1 164 0.943 1 1 0.417 0.667
3-Apr-03 0 164 0.943 0 0 0.417 0.667
4-Apr-03 0 164 0.943 0 0 0.417 0.667
5-Apr-03 0 164 0.943 0 0 0.417 0.667
6-Apr-03 0 164 0.943 0 0 0.417 0.667
7-Apr-03 1 163 0.937 0 1 0.423 0.688
8-Apr-03 1 162 0.931 0 1 0.429 0.706
9-Apr-03 0 162 0.931 3 3 0.387 0.600
10-Apr-03 1 161 0.925 0 1 0.394 0.619
11-Apr-03 0 161 0.925 0 0 0.394 0.619
12-Apr-03 0 161 0.925 0 0 0.394 0.619
13-Apr-03 0 161 0.925 0 0 0.394 0.619
14-Apr-03 0 161 0.925 1 1 0.382 0.591
15-Apr-03 0 161 0.925 1 1 0.371 0.565
16-Apr-03 0 161 0.925 1 1 0.361 0.542
17-Apr-03 0 161 0.925 0 0 0.361 0.542
TOTALS 13 11 23  
At the end of the 30-day period, 13 items were issued from the MRSP resulting in 
a 92.5% fill rate.  There were 11 MICAPs for an item authorized in the MRSP and 12 
MICAPs for items not authorized in the MRSP for a total of 23 MICAPS.  The ratio 
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between issues and authorized item MICAPS resulted in a stockage effectiveness of 
54.2%.  The ratio of issues and total MICAPS resulted in an issue effectiveness of 36.1%.  
The comparisons of fill rate, issue effectiveness, and stockage effectiveness with 
overall weapon system metrics and goals are shown in Table 9.  The first column shows 
each type of measurement.  The next column shows the measurements for the F-16C 
MRSP.  Each corresponding column pair shows the comparison metric and the difference 
(Delta) between the MRSP measurement and the comparison metric.  Deltas in 
parenthesis represent a negative difference. 
Table 9.  MRSP Measures vs. Comparison Metrics 
 MRSP OIF F-16 Total Delta 
AFMC 
2003 Goal Delta 
2003 F-16 
Total Delta 
Fill Rate 92.5% 92.4% .1% --- --- --- --- 
I/E 36.1% --- --- 67% (30.9%) 71.7% (35.6%)
S/E 54.2% --- --- 77% (22.8%) 82.7% (28.5%)
 
Total requirements variance is shown in Table 10.  The first row shows totals for 
the number of items in the MRSP and the cost of those items.  The second row shows 
totals for the number of items issued from the MRSP during the 30-day period and the 
cost of those items.  The last row shows the difference between the first and second rows.  
Table 10.  Total Requirements Variance of F-16C MRSP 
 Number of Items Total Cost 
Line Items Available 174 $ 13,766,422.93 
Line Items Used 13 $ 1,860,280.13  
TRV 161 $ 11,906,142.80 
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Analysis:  Of the 174 line items stocked in this MRSP, 13 were issued during the 
first 30 days of OIF.  The ending fill rate of 92.5% is only .1% more than the cumulative 
fill rates for all F-16 aircraft participating in OIF.   
MICAPs for unauthorized parts were higher than authorized part MICAPS, but 
only by one reparable.  With 12 of the 23 MICAPs being for parts not authorized in the 
MRSP, 52% of the MICAPs were for parts not listed on the MESL as critical grounding 
spares.  The overall MICAP rate was very high with respect to actual MRSP issues.  With 
13 issues for authorized parts and 23 total MICAPs for unavailable parts, only 36.1% of 
reparable item needs were met by the MRSP. 
Issue effectiveness rates for this MRSP did not compare favorably with either the 
AFMC F-16 goals or the 2003 calendar year supply chain total rates.  This MRSP fell 
below the AFMC goal by 30.9% and the 2003 rate by 35.6%.  This means that this F-16C 
MRSP provided less of the right spares to meet demand requirements than expected. 
Stockage effectiveness rates for this MRSP also compared unfavorably with 
aggregate metrics and goals.  This MRSP fell below the AFMC goal by 22.8% and the 
2003 rate by 28.5%.  This means that this F-16C MRSP had less of the authorized spares 
needed to meet demand requirements than expected.  
The total requirements variance showed that of the 174 items stocked in the 
MRSP, 161 items were still in the MRSP at the end of the 30-day period.  This means 
only 7.5% of the MRSP was actually required.  The total cost of the MRSP showed a 
variance of $11,906,142 between the cost of items stocked and the cost of items used.  
This means the MRSP contained over seven times the value of the items actually issued 
to repair the weapon systems. 
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HC-130P MRSP Results 
MRSP Composition: The data from the D087G provided a listing of each item 
considered for inclusion in the MRSP.  Elements included stock number, quantity per 
application (QPA), cost per item, and authorized requirement quantity.  Table 11 shows a 
summary of the configuration of the HC-130P MRSP.  The first row shows information 
on the items loaded into the D087G from the Mission Essential Subsystem List (MESL).  
The second row shows information on the items actually selected by the ASM for 
inclusion in the MRSP.  The first column shows the total number of stock number items 
either considered or selected.  The second column shows the total number of line items 
either considered or selected.  The last column shows the total cost of the MRSP 
calculated by the sum of the products of cost per item and total number of line items 
either considered or selected.  In this case, selected stock number items, line items, and 
total cost all decreased from the corresponding considered values. 
Table 11.  Configuration of HC-130P MRSP 
 Stock Number Items Line Items Total Cost 
Units Considered 179 484 $ 7,058,276.32 
Units Selected 132 271 $ 4,823,335.22 
 
MRSP Performance:  Fill rate, issue effectiveness, and stockage effectiveness were 
calculated from the demand data captured from the D002A and the D165B using the 
methods described in the last chapter.  Table 12 shows the results of those calculations. 
At the end of the 30-day period, 20 items were issued from the MRSP resulting in a 
92.6% fill rate.  There were four MICAPs for authorized items in the MRSP and zero 
MICAPS for items not authorized in the MRSP for a total of four MICAPS.  The ratio 
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between issues and authorized item MICAPS resulted in a stockage effectiveness of 
83.3%.  The ratio of issues and total MICAPS resulted in an issue effectiveness of 83.3%.  
Table 12.  Performance Metrics for HC-130P MRSP 
FILLED 
AUTHORIZED ITEM 
REQ
AVAILABLE KIT 
LINE ITEMS FILL RATE
AUTHORIZED ITEM 
MICAPS
TOTAL 
MICAPS I/E S/E
19-Mar-03 0 271 1.000 0 0 1.000 1.000
20-Mar-03 2 269 0.993 0 0 1.000 1.000
21-Mar-03 0 269 0.993 0 0 1.000 1.000
22-Mar-03 0 269 0.993 0 0 1.000 1.000
23-Mar-03 1 268 0.989 0 0 1.000 1.000
24-Mar-03 0 268 0.989 0 0 1.000 1.000
25-Mar-03 0 268 0.989 0 0 1.000 1.000
26-Mar-03 0 268 0.989 0 0 1.000 1.000
27-Mar-03 0 268 0.989 0 0 1.000 1.000
28-Mar-03 0 268 0.989 0 0 1.000 1.000
29-Mar-03 0 268 0.989 0 0 1.000 1.000
30-Mar-03 0 268 0.989 0 0 1.000 1.000
31-Mar-03 2 266 0.982 0 0 1.000 1.000
1-Apr-03 0 266 0.982 1 1 0.833 0.833
2-Apr-03 0 266 0.982 0 0 0.833 0.833
3-Apr-03 0 266 0.982 0 0 0.833 0.833
4-Apr-03 0 266 0.982 0 0 0.833 0.833
5-Apr-03 0 266 0.982 0 0 0.833 0.833
6-Apr-03 2 264 0.974 0 0 0.875 0.875
7-Apr-03 0 264 0.974 0 0 0.875 0.875
8-Apr-03 0 264 0.974 0 0 0.875 0.875
9-Apr-03 1 263 0.970 0 0 0.889 0.889
10-Apr-03 0 263 0.970 0 0 0.889 0.889
11-Apr-03 0 263 0.970 1 1 0.800 0.800
12-Apr-03 0 263 0.970 0 0 0.800 0.800
13-Apr-03 7 256 0.945 0 0 0.882 0.882
14-Apr-03 0 256 0.945 0 0 0.882 0.882
15-Apr-03 0 256 0.945 0 0 0.882 0.882
16-Apr-03 5 251 0.926 0 0 0.909 0.909
17-Apr-03 0 251 0.926 2 2 0.833 0.833
TOTALS 20 4 4  
The comparisons of fill rate, issue effectiveness, and stockage effectiveness with 
overall weapon system metrics and goals are shown in Table 13.  The first column shows 
each type of measurement.  The next column shows the measurements for the HC-130P 
MRSP.  Each corresponding column pair shows the comparison metric and the difference 
(Delta) between the MRSP measurement and the comparison metric.  Deltas in 
parenthesis represent a negative difference. 
 
 
 
42 
Table 13.  MRSP Measures vs. Comparison Metrics 
 MRSP 
OIF       
HC-130 
Total 
Delta AFMC 2003 Goal Delta 
2003    
HC-130 
Total 
Delta 
Fill Rate 92.6% 92.5% .1% --- --- --- --- 
I/E 83.3% --- --- 64% 19.3% 70% 13.3% 
S/E 83.3% --- --- 80% 3.3% 89.4% (6.1%) 
 
Total requirements variance is shown in Table 14.  The first row shows totals for 
the number of items in the MRSP and the cost of those items.  The second row shows 
totals for the number of items issued from the MRSP during the 30-day period and the 
cost of those items.  The last row shows the difference between the first and second rows.  
Table 14.  Total Requirements Variance of HC-130P MRSP 
 Number of Items Total Cost 
Line Items Available 271 $ 4,823,335.22 
Line Items Used 20 $ 181,718.37 
TRV 251 $ 4,641,616.85 
 
Analysis:  Of the 271 line items stocked in this MRSP, 20 were issued during the 
first 30 days of OIF.  The ending fill rate of 92.6% is only .1% more than the cumulative 
fill rates for all HC-130 aircraft participating in OIF.   
There were no MICAPs for unauthorized parts.  All four MICAPs for aircraft 
supported by this MRSP were for parts listed on the MESL as critical grounding spares.  
The MRSP did not contain the spares to meet those repeat requirements.  However, the 
overall MICAP rate was low with respect to actual MRSP issues.  With 20 issues for 
authorized parts and four total MICAPs for unavailable parts, 83.3% of reparable item 
needs were met by the MRSP. 
 
43 
Issue effectiveness rates for this MRSP compared very favorably with the AFMC 
HC-130 goals and the 2003 calendar year supply chain total rates.  This MRSP beat the 
AFMC goal by 19.3% and the 2003 rate by 13.3%.  This means that this HC-130P MRSP 
provided more of the right spares to meet demand requirements than expected. 
Stockage effectiveness rates for this MRSP also compared favorably with 
aggregate metrics and goals.  This MRSP beat the AFMC goal by 3.3%.  However, it did 
fall behind the 2003 rate by 6.1%.  Overall, this HC-130P MRSP had more of the 
authorized spares to meet demand requirements than expected, but less than the historical 
totals.  
The total requirements variance showed that of the 271 items stocked in the 
MRSP, 251 items were still in the MRSP at the end of the 30-day period.  This means 
only 7.4% of the MRSP was actually required.  The total cost of the MRSP showed a 
variance of $4,641,616 between the cost of items stocked and the cost of items used.  
This means the MRSP contained over 27 times the value of the items actually issued to 
repair the weapon systems. 
Summary 
This chapter presented the results of the data collection, which showed that two of 
the three MRSPs performed favorably with regards to issue and stockage effectiveness 
when compared to MAJCOM 2003 goals and rates.  All three MRSPs maintained a fill 
rate almost equal to that of the total weapon system MRSP fill rate during the entire 
conflict period.  Data analysis also showed a large variance in two factors—the number 
of items in the MRSP versus the number of items actually used, and the cost of the items 
 
44 
in the MRSP versus the cost of the items used. The next chapter will consider the 
implications of these results as well as discuss other possible areas for research. 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter Overview 
This thesis research effort was conducted with the goal of gaining an 
understanding of how MRSPs are performing in real-world contingency operations.  
Although the Air Force has been officially operating under a new force and deployment 
structure since 1999, MRSP configuration policies remain essentially unchanged.  In 
order to reach the aforementioned goal, the research was structured to answer two main 
investigative questions and two sub-questions. 
1. How were MRSPs configured for OIF? 
2. Did MRSPs effectively support the weapon systems during the first 30 days of 
operations? 
 
a. Did the MRSPs have enough spares for aircraft maintenance personnel to 
keep aircraft mission capable?  In other words, did we take what was 
needed to the conflict? 
 
b. Did the MRSPs have the right spares for aircraft maintenance personnel to 
keep aircraft mission capable?  In other words, did we need what we took 
to the conflict? 
 
This chapter will first discuss the answers to these questions and the conclusions 
that can be drawn from those answers.  Then it will present recommendations for action.  
Finally the remainder of the chapter will identify areas of future research that would 
continue to add insight into this subject matter. 
Conclusions 
This section answers the investigative questions and sub-questions originally 
posed in Chapter one and restated in the introduction of this chapter.  The answer to 
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Investigative Question one was obtained through information provided by the responsible 
office.  The answers to Investigative Question two and Sub-questions one and two were 
obtained from the analysis performed in Chapter four. 
How were MRSPs configured for OIF? 
Research showed that MRSP configuration for OIF was accomplished using the 
WMP-5 flying hour scenario.  The D087G was the tool used to stock the MRSPs with the 
reparables calculated by the ASM.  Although the Air Force deployed its personnel under 
the AEF schedule, the MRSPs were still configured to support a different operational 
scenario. 
Did MRSPs effectively support the weapon systems during the first 30 days 
of operations? 
Although Air Force leadership has mandated that the ultimate measure of supply 
chain success is aircraft availability, there are other factors that determine effectiveness.  
The measures selected to determine the effectiveness of the three MRSPs studied in this 
research—fill rate, MICAP rates, issue effectiveness, stockage effectiveness, and total 
requirements variance— show that the MRSPs were effective in some respects and 
ineffective in others.  Specifically, the MRSPs for the E-3B and HC-130P were 
considerably more effective than the F-16C MRSP. 
Did the MRSPs have enough spares for the maintainers to keep aircraft 
mission capable? 
The two effectiveness measures that best show whether the MRSPs contained 
enough of what was needed to support operations are fill rate and stockage effectiveness.  
Table 15 summarizes these two measurements for each weapon system MRSP. 
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Table 15.  Fill Rate and Stockage Effectiveness Summary 
 Fill Rate Stockage Effectiveness 
E-3B 96.0% 97.1% 
F-16C 92.5% 54.2% 
HC-130P 92.6% 83.3% 
 
All three MRSPs maintained high fill rates equivalent to overall weapon system 
MRSP fill rates during the contingency.  Requirements for this MRSP did not appear to 
be driven by the need to fill holes that existed prior to the deployment.  Unmet demands 
were either for assets not authorized to be in the MRSPs or for assets that had multiple 
requirements above the number of authorized MRSP assets. 
When compared to MAJCOM standards and annual rates, two of the three 
MRSPs contained an above average amount of reparables for maintenance personnel to 
repair the aircraft, as reflected by the stockage effectiveness rate.  Stockage effectiveness 
was driven by the number of authorized part MICAPs for the weapon system.  A MRSP 
that did not contain enough spares to cover multiple requirements for the same spare 
would experience low stockage effectiveness.   
Both the E-3B and the HC-130P MRSPs had low authorized part MICAP 
occurrences when compared to total requests against the MRSP.  For the E-3B MRSP, 
authorized spare MICAPs represented less than 3% of total MRSP requests.  For the HC-
130P MRSP, authorized spare MICAPs represented less than17% of total MRSP 
requests.  Asset requirements above MRSP authorizations resulted in a below average 
performance from the F16C MRSP.  For the F-16C MRSP, authorized part MICAPs 
accounted for almost 31% of the total requests against the MRSP.  At the end of the first 
30 days of OIF, the MRSPs for the E-3B and HC-130P had enough spares to satisfy the 
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majority of authorized reparable requests.  The F-16C MRSP did not have enough spares 
to satisfy almost half of the authorized reparable requests. 
Did the MRSPs have the right spares for the maintainers to keep aircraft 
mission capable? 
The two effectiveness measures that best show whether maintenance personnel 
needed what was in the MRSPs to support weapon system repairs are issue effectiveness 
and total requirements variance (TRV).  Table 16 summarizes these two measurements 
for each weapon system MRSP. 
Table 16.  Issue Effectiveness and TRV Summary 
 Issue Effectiveness 
Line Item 
TRV Cost TRV 
E-3B 89.5% 811 $ 38,974,668.43 
F-16C 36.1% 161 $ 11,906,142.80 
HC-130P 83.3% 251 $ 4,641,616.85 
 
When compared to MAJCOM standards and annual rates, two of the three 
MRSPs contained an above average depth of necessary reparables for maintenance 
personnel to repair the aircraft, as reflected by the issue effectiveness rate.  Issue 
effectiveness was driven by the number of total weapon system MICAPs, for both 
authorized and unauthorized MRSP assets.  A MRSP that did not contain the right type of 
spares to cover repair requirements would experience low issue effectiveness.   
Both the E-3B and the HC-130P MRSPs had low total MICAP occurrences when 
compared to total requests against the MRSP.  For the E-3B MRSP, total MICAPs 
represented less than 11% of total MRSP requests.  For the HC-130P MRSP, total 
MICAPs represented less than 17% of total MRSP requests.  Asset requirements above 
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MRSP spares availability resulted in a below average performance from the F16C MRSP.  
For the F-16C MRSP, total MICAPs accounted for almost 64% of the total requests 
against the MRSP.  At the end of the first 30 days of OIF, the MRSPs for the E-3B and 
HC-130P had the right spares to satisfy the majority of reparable requests.  The F-16C 
MRSP did not have the right spares to satisfy almost 65% of the authorized reparable 
requests. 
All three MRSPs showed a large TRV in both line item quantity and cost.  
Although an MRSP is designed to meet the particular needs of a specific weapon system, 
the underutilization of assets specifically selected to minimize aircraft grounding has 
several implications.  First, the spares in these MRSPs were removed from the supply 
pipeline and made unavailable to satisfy other requirements, MICAP or otherwise.  Next, 
for these three MRSPs alone, over $56 million in spares were purchased for requirements 
that did not occur.  Third, the logistics footprint left by these three MRSPs, to include 
transportation, warehousing, and accountability requirements, was probably substantial.  
Finally, regulations mandate that “items and quantities in RSPs will, in all cases, be the 
minimum necessary to support major command required missions as reflected in the 
WMP tasking” (DAF, 2004:Ch.14, 6).  These three MRSPs do not appear to meet this 
requirement. 
Recommendations 
This research effort showed that MRSP effectiveness during Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM could have been better, specifically for the three MRSPs examined.  The 
 
50 
following recommendations for action may help improve overall MRSP effectiveness for 
future contingencies. 
The first recommendation is that the USAF should establish and maintain an 
official contingency demand database for MRSPs.  AFLMA reported in March 2000 that 
“there are no programs or procedures in AFMAN 23-110 to describe collecting and 
transferring reparable demand data from the contingency site to the home base” (Smith, 
2000:1).  A contingency demand database would accomplish several goals.  First, it 
would reduce the amount of data extraction and compilation required from multiple data 
sources to obtain an accurate picture of contingency requirements, something 
experienced by this researcher first hand.  Next, it would provide the ASM with actual 
wartime reparable failure rates as opposed to the peacetime failure rates used to set 
MRSP levels.  If there is a difference between wartime and peacetime demand patterns, 
the ASM may not be providing as accurate a product using peacetime failure rates.  
Finally, for MRSP review purposes, contingency data will provide a true picture of 
MRSP performance during wartime as opposed to one provided by aggregated wartime 
and peacetime data.   
The second recommendation is that the USAF consider whether MRSPs should 
still be required to maintain assets to satisfy 30 days without resupply in today’s 
contingency environment.  The real ability for reach back and resupply, as accomplished 
to satisfy MICAPs, might make the 30-day requirement an unnecessary condition of 
MRSP spares configuration.  Contingency operations are unpredictable and MRSPs 
satisfy a real requirement for on-hand reparable assets in an uncertain environment.  
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However, the speed and effectiveness of the logistics pipeline to satisfy reparable 
requirements should be considered as a possible MRSP inventory reduction tool. 
The third recommendation is that the USAF review the contingency MICAPs that 
were not predicted on the MESL as grounding spares.  The F-16C MRSP in particular 
experienced a high number of demands for reparable items that were not authorized to be 
in the MRSP.  Contingency MICAP data would help show whether there are new 
reparables that should be considered for inclusion on the MESL. 
The final recommendation is that the USAF consider whether the War and 
Mobilization Plan, Volume 5 (WMP-5) still provides the best guidelines for establishing 
MRSP inventory.  If the ASM is dependent upon the contingency data provided in the 
WMP-5 to formulate the “best mix of spares” for the MRSP, it stands to reason that the 
more accurate the plan, the better the output.  Leadership should question whether the 
WMP-5 is still the best plan on which to base MRSP composition when its scenario does 
not match today’s warfighting environment. 
Future Research 
This research identified effectiveness issues with three specific MRSPs during 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.  Four areas of additional research could continue to 
enhance Air Force knowledge of how MRSP composition affects effectiveness during 
contingency operations. 
First, a continuation of MRSP contingency performance documentation is 
necessary.  The provision of accurate contingency data will help logistics leaders make 
improvements in MRSP configuration.  The performance of either other MRSPs during 
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OIF or MRSPs during other contingency operations could be measured and compared 
with the results of this research. 
Second, a study of the factors used in the ASM could be accomplished.  An 
analysis of the seven additional ASM considerations outlined in Chapter two could reveal 
which ones, in addition to cost and the direct support objective, contribute most to the 
reparables selected for inclusion in the MRSP. 
Third, a conclusive link between MRSP effectiveness and aircraft availability 
could be established.  If the main purpose of the supply chain is to enable desirable levels 
of aircraft availability, leadership should know how different parts of the supply chain, 
including MRSPs, contribute to the rates.  This would require analyzing mission capable 
data, including MICAP and total non-mission capable supply (TNMCS) hours and rates, 
and actual flying hours at the individual tail number level to determine the effect on the 
availability of the aircraft inventory. 
Finally, use of the WMP-5 as the document that dictates MRSP support 
parameters could be addressed.  A study that compares current MRSP configuration 
policy with a MRSP configured using parameters that reflect a current or recent AEF 
deployment and contingency response scenarios could possibly provide an improved 
method for determining MRSP reparable requirements. 
Summary 
In this research, the primary research question proposed in Chapter one, “What 
was the effect of MRSP configuration on current Air Force contingency operations 
support?” was answered by developing and answering two investigative questions.  
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Chapter two reviewed literature directed at guiding the research towards the information 
required to answer the investigative questions central to the research question.  Chapter 
three defined and described the methodology developed to answer the investigative 
questions.  Chapter four provided an analysis of the results obtained from applying the 
suggested methodology.  Finally, conclusions were made about the effectiveness of 
MRSPs during OIF, as well as recommendations for action and suggestions for future 
research on MRSP configuration effectiveness. 
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Appendix 1.  Sample of SBSS Transaction Report 
1005000179540   3300 118 AR ZZZ ZZZ  ZZZ        XB3  S9C  ISU  3P       3 
R118AR30850009             C   000SHOPZZZZZZZ 26-MAR-03 DETENT PAWL     S9C                 
1005000179540   3300 118 AR ZZZ ZZZ  ZZZ        XB3  S9C  DUO  4W       2 
R118AR30850009             C   000SHOPZZZZZZZ 26-MAR-03 DETENT PAWL     S9C                 
1005000179543   2067 677 SE ??? 187  7          XB3  S9C  DUO  4W       5 
R677SE30830087          T  A   CRAIG63187     25-MAR-03 HANDLE ASSEMB   S9C                 
1005000179546   2027 655 AE ??? 727  754        XB3  B14  DUO  4W      15 
R655AE30930011          M  A   HUNTSMN72754ZZ 03-APR-03 HANDLE ASSEMB   B14                 
1005000179546   2067 677 SE ??? 318  87         XB3  B14  DUO  4W       5 
R677SE30830035          T  A   CRAIG 63187    25-MAR-03 HANDLE ASSY     B14                 
1005000179546   4427 687 AT ZZZ ZZZ  ZZZ        XB3  B14  DUO  4W       5 
X687AT30800710          M  B   SHOPUSEZZZZZ   23-MAR-03 CHARGING HAND   B14                 
1005000179546   5810 224 CO RSB RSB  BZZ        XB3  B14  DUO  4W       2 
X224CO30850001 Q    9GF O  A   SHOPUSERSBZZ1C 26-MAR-03 HANDLE ASSY,C   B14                 
1005000179547   2067 677 SE ??? -31  187        XB3  S9C  DUO  4W       5 
R677SE30830016          T  A   CRAIG 6-3187   24-MAR-03 PIN             S9C                 
1005000179547   4608 416 SQ ZZZ ZZZ  ZZZ        XB3  S9C  DUO  4W      20 
X416SQ30901000 G           B   CATMZZZZZZZZ1C 31-MAR-03 PIN,FIRING      S9C                 
1005000179547   4690 480 SA ZZZ ZZZ  ZZZ        XB3  S9C  DUO  4W       5 
X480SA30930745          M  A   CATMZZZZZZZZZZ 03-APR-03 PIN, FIRING     S9C                 
1005000179547   5810 224 CO RSB RSB  BZZ        XB3  S9C  DUO  4W       6 
X224CO31050003 Q    9GJ O  A   M16A200RSBZZ1C 15-APR-03 PIN,FIRING      S9C                 
1005000179547   5819 380 OP BL5 BL5  5CA        XB3  S9C  DUO  4W       5 
X380OP30650010      9BU O  A   BLODGETBL5CA1C 23-MAR-03 PIN, FIRING     S9C                 
1005000179548   2067 677 SE ??? -31  187        XB3  S9C  DUO  4W       5 
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Appendix 2.  Sample of D0165G Report 
60F016XXXXXXXX             1005000566753  GUN,AUTOMATIC,20 MI275AAB  1248728  1  257   43  
214  6  6 830RRRLRUY     T8000AEA    1    0    1 100 17  0  11               000               
000               000               000 10010000    0    0    0        0F016C.000000000 
60F016XXXXXXXX             1005010086283  HOUSING,MACHINE GUN275A99   590892  1    0    0    
0  2  2 7 6RR LRUY     T800XAEA    1    0    1 100  0  0  11               000               
000               000               000 10010000    0    0    0        0F016C.000000000 
60F016XXXXXXXX             1005010446174  DRUM ASSEMBLY,AMMUN275ABC  3098580  1  184  110   
74  6  6 830RR LRUY     T8000AEA    1    0    1 100 60  0  11               000               
000               000               000 10010000    0    0    0        0F016C.000000000 
60F016XXXXXXXX             1005010463536  TRANSFER UNIT,AMMUN275ACA  1143834  1  147  110   
37 10  6 730RR LRUY     T8000AEA    1    0    1 100 75  0  10               000               
000               000               000 10010000    0    0    0        0F016C.000000000 
60F016XXXXXXXX             1005010556484  ACCESS UNIT,LOADING275ACE   602902  1  511  408  
102  9  6 730RR LRUY     T8000AEA    1    0    1 100 80  0  10               000               
000               000               000 10010000    0    0    0        0F016C.000000000 
60F016XXXXXXXX             1260014396698WFGENERATOR,DISPLAY,P174KG0 10255400  1 1823  768 
1056  4  415 9RR LRUC     T0000AEA    1    0    1 100 42  0  10               000               
000               000               000 10010000    0    0    0        0F016C.000000000 
60F016XXXXXXXX             1270012330011WFRECEIVER-GENERATOR,274AN0 32523200  1 3162 2299  
862  5  512 8RR LRUC     T1000AEA    1    0    1 100 73  0  10               000               
000               000               000 10010000    0    0    0        0F016C.000000000 
60F016XXXXXXXX             1270012383662WFTRANSMITTER SUBASSE274AP0 60354300  1 1470  895  
575  5  51430RR LRUC     T1000AEA    0    0    0 100 61  0  10               000               
000               000               000 10010000    0    0    0        0F016C.000000000 
60F016XXXXXXXX             1270013963088WFPROCESSOR,RADAR TAR274AY0 42367600  1 1896  271 
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Appendix 3.  Sample of D165B Report 
FSC NIIN MMAC
MICAP 
Hrs
MTD 
MICAP 
Hrs Units
. MICAP 
Incident MDS Eq Designator SRAN SRAN
Cause 
Code Doc .
5995 000012546 EW 482 421 1 1 ALQ184V ALQ184V7 FB5284 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30570187
5995 000012546 EW 171 171 1 1 ALQ184V ALQ184V7 FB5284 FBXXXX J FBXXXX30700018
9540 000015135 48 48 12 1 T038C T038C FB4830 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30709001
5985 000015788 EH 25 25 1 1 GPN020 GPN020 FB4484 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30839253
5935 000015920 EH 39 39 1 1 F015E F015E FB4852 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30639816
5935 000018645 EH 35 35 1 1 A010A A010A FB4852 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30779803
5306 000019756 447 447 10 1 MJ1 MJ1 FB6221 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30720170
6625 000030971 ID 93 59 1 1 MEP006A MEP006A FB5587 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30580106
6625 000030971 ID 705 254 1 1 MEP005A MEP005A FB5810 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30419811
6625 000030972 TG 469 254 1 1 MEP005A MEP005A FB5810 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30519806
6625 000030972 TG 98 98 1 1 MEP113A MEP113A FB6141 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30659300
6625 000030972 TG 705 254 1 1 MEP005A MEP005A FB5810 FBXXXX B FBXXXX30419813
1560 000031965 UC 4 4 1 1 C005A C005A FB4419 FBXXXX B FBXXXX30629158
1560 000031965 UC 30 30 1 1 C005A C005A FB4419 FBXXXX B FBXXXX30629158
4730 000038824 SX 92 92 1 1 F016C F016C FB5004 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30729553
6145 000039527 EH 77 77 99 1 M32A86D M32A86D FB6606 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30690562
5331 000043096 SX 38 38 22 1 HH060G HH060G FB4852 FBXXXX H FBXXXX30709809
5305 000043162 SX 142 84 4 1 M32A86D M32A86D FB6482 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30570153
3110 000043166 26 26 1 1 T038A T038A FB3029 FBXXXX J FBXXXX30620131
3110 000043166 22 22 1 1 T038A T038A FB3029 FBXXXX J FBXXXX30620175
3110 000043166 96 61 1 1 T038A T038A FB3029 FBXXXX K FBXXXX30580123
2840 000043966 SX 119 119 1 1 T56A15 T0056015 FB2500 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30720094
5315 000045048 SX 90 90 2 1 MS7T20 MS7T20 FB6131 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30660533
1560 000045581 SX 311 311 1 1 GRDHAND GRDHAND FB3010 FBXXXX A FBXXXX23170126
5905 000046112 EH 95 95 1 1 E24T169 E24T169 FB5000 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30800103
5331 000046392 PP 78 78 6 1 T56A7B T0056007B FB5612 FBXXXX R FBXXXX30849802
9535 000047321 320 320 1 1 F016C F016C FB5004 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30779557
9535 000047321 301 301 1 1 F016C F016C FB5004 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30789528
5330 000050413 SX 25 25 18 1 T038C T038C FB4830 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30639000
5960 000052080 EH 117 117 1 1 TPN024 TPN024 FB5808 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30809800
5935 000052826 SX 78 78 1 1 F016C F016C FB4855 FBXXXX B FBXXXX30809803
5935 000052828 SX 44 44 1 1 C005A C005A FB6606 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30890047
6625 000053858 TG 150 150 1 1 GPN022 GPN022 FB4852 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30700032
6850 000055305 272 272 1 1 F016C F016C FB4852 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30669820
6850 000055305 676 77 24 1 F016C F016C FB4852 FBXXXX H FBXXXX30350659
6850 000055305 34 34 22 1 F016C F016C FB4852 FBXXXX H FBXXXX30639804
6850 000055305 52 52 2 1 F016C F016C FB4852 FBXXXX H FBXXXX30779520
5320 000056252 SX 84 84 2 1 F015C F015C FB5270 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30800420
4720 000057548 SX 1246 744 2 1 ACE8023 ACE802329S FB5685 FBXXXX A FBXXXX30399301
5330 000058557 SX 113 113 2 1 C005A C005A FB6606 FBXXXX H FBXXXX30869803  
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